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Abstract
The paper assesses the distributional and efficiency/disincentive aspects of
the Greek indirect tax system, which provides 60% of total tax revenue. The
marginal welfare costs of broad commodity groups were computed to identify
welfare-improving directions of reform. The disincentive effects were
estimated from marginal indirect tax rates using Household Expenditure
Survey data.  The indirect tax structure is shown to be unnecessarily
complicated and inefficient, without achieving any redistributive goals. The
UK indirect tax structure was shown to be simpler, more equitable and more
efficient to implement and administer when simulated on Greek consumers.
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1.    Introduction 
Greece is unusual among EU countries in the large share of indirect taxes in total tax revenue 
(60% compared to an average of around 40% for the OECD countries or the EU-15, OECD 
1999), and the considerable variation in individual indirect tax rates.
1 This variability in tax rates 
results from the large number of different taxes levied often on the same good,
2 and to a large 
extent survives despite joining the European Union and adopting the EU system of Value Added 
Taxes (VAT). The EU VAT system initiated by the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 
May 1977 and its various amendments
3 was intended both to harmonise taxes within and across 
countries, and gives limited discretion to member countries in the number of different rates and 
the extent to which they can be varied. Perhaps more surprising, both the heavy emphasis on 
indirect taxes and their variability have survived substantial tax reforms that have raised Greece's 
tax share in GDP from 24% to 37.4% from 1980 to 1999 (Ministry of Finance and Economy, 
2001), though the share of indirect taxes in total revenue has fallen from 70% to 60% over that 
period. The introduction of VAT in the late 1980s simplified indirect taxes somewhat, and since 
then there have been further but modest simplifications. Greece is now contemplating a major 
reform of its entire tax system, and thus needs to consider whether these particular features of 
the current tax system are the result of historic accident, political expediency, or a considered 
view of the social objectives of the Greek people that should be defended and retained. 
  The balance between indirect and direct taxation is not the direct concern of this paper, 
and will depend on the efficacy of direct and indirect tax collection (Newbery, 1992; 1997), the 
costs of tax collection (Slemrod, 1990), the extent to which indirect taxes are considered an 
efficient way of taxing tourists (compared, say, to hotel taxes and airport charges), and the extent 
to which indirect taxes are less visible than direct taxes, and hence less objectionable to swing 
voters (in the middle classes). This paper addresses the second feature of the indirect tax system, 
and the extent to which the high degree of variability in tax rates can be defended on social 
welfare grounds. Not only is this timely, given the current interest in major tax reform in Greece, 
but, despite the overwhelming importance of indirect taxes in total Greek revenue, there are 
surprisingly few systematic up-to-date studies available. The few papers on the Greek indirect 
tax system are either fragmentary (Grevenitis and Sapounas, 1988; Georgakopoulos, 1989), or 
outdated (Karageorgas, 1973; Provopoulos, 1979). 
  There is one caveat that should be borne clearly in mind when examining any part of a 
tax system, and certainly in the present paper. The component taxes within a properly designed 
tax system can only be assessed within the context of the whole system, which includes the 
expenditure side of the budget. If tax compliance and administration costs allow a reasonably 
effective system of direct taxation, then indirect taxes can be left to make minor improvements 
to distributional and efficiency goals (as well as correcting for market failures, such as the social 
and/or environmental damage caused by consuming certain goods). A well-designed system of 
social expenditure (on health, education, and welfare) and transfers (to the poor, as child 
support, etc.) is a better method of addressing distributional concerns than most taxes. It follows 
that uniform tax rates combined with such well-designed expenditures can be part of an efficient 
yet egalitarian tax and expenditure system. Criticising indirect taxes because they are not 
adequately progressive or redistributive would therefore be unreasonable without first 
                                                           
1 For a comparative study of consumption taxes in OECD countries, see OECD (1999). 
2  See Table A1 for the tax rates by commodity group and the variability within groups. 
3 For a comprehensive overview of the Sixth directive and its amendments, see the relevant internet site of the 
European Union, http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l31006.htm. 
  1demonstrating that such distributional goals could not better be achieved either with other parts 
of the tax system or through changes to the expenditure side of the budget. 
  To see how important this is for the reform of indirect taxation, section 2 derives 
formulae for the marginal social cost of raising revenue from particular indirect taxes. If these 
are not equal across goods, then the same revenue can be raised at lower social cost by raising 
taxes on the good with the lower marginal social cost and lowering the tax on one with a higher 
social marginal cost. The marginal social cost depends both on distributional considerations, and 
the product of tax rates and various own and cross-price elasticities of aggregate demand. If the 
only possible reform consists of revenue-neutral adjustments of indirect tax rates, then this 
approach (of marginal tax reform analysis) has some merit, though it is not without its own 
problems, as we shall see. If distributional considerations are not too important, then taxing 
inelastically demanded goods more heavily than elastically demanded goods appears defensible 
(but conversely if distributional considerations are very important, and are reflected sufficiently 
in different consumption patterns of the rich and poor). 
  In order to estimate these elasticities, moderately strong restrictions have to be placed on 
the form of consumer demands, and these, together with a wider choice of tax instruments, can 
largely predetermine the outcome.  Thus weak  separability between goods and leisure in the 
utility function combined with Engel curves which are linear and have the same intercept, the 
ability to tax all goods, and the ability to redistribute tax revenue in the form of lump-sum 
grants, implies that indirect taxes should be made uniform (Atkinson, 1977; Deaton, 1979 and 
1981). Even in the case where the intercepts of the Engel curves vary across households on the 
basis of observable household characteristics, uniformity of indirect taxation is still optimal 
provided that the government can apply an optimal system of family grants (Deaton and Stern, 
1986). If non-linear income taxes can also be optimally set, then all we need for the optimality of 
uniform indirect taxes is weak separability of goods and labour and individuals differing only in 
the wage rate (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976; Deaton, 1981; Stern, 1987).
4  Uniform commodity 
taxes then deliver the consumption bundle to workers at least cost (by creating minimum relative 
price distortion), encouraging them to work harder by confining distortions to the supply of 
labour (effort). 
  The case for non-uniform commodity taxation then rests on the extra leverage such 
differentiation gives over labour supply - there is then a case for heavier taxes on goods that are 
complementary to leisure (golf clubs?), and lighter taxes on goods complementary to work 
(commuting?). As it is both hard to think of such taxes that do not create unreasonable extra 
distortionary costs, and whose elasticities can be estimated sufficiently reliably, there is an 
arguable presumption for uniformity of indirect Value Added Taxes (VAT). There are additional 
advantages of uniform VAT in terms of lower administrative and collection costs. 
  It is therefore likely to be difficult for Greece to defend its very non-uniform indirect tax 
structure. One possible defence is that there are very few other instruments that can be used to 
improve the overall tax and expenditure structure. For example, it is clearly perceived to be 
difficult to achieve all the desired redistribution from personal income taxes (which collect 
remarkably little revenue from some segments of the population that are clearly relatively well 
off, such as the professional classes and the self-employed). We observe that Greece has finally 
balanced its budget and met the Maastricht criteria exclusively through substantial increases in 
the share of GDP taken in taxes, so that the expenditure side of the budget is also severely 
constrained. 
   If this is accepted, then we can ask whether indirect taxes offer any serious prospect of 
relaxing these constraints, and contributing anything to distributional equity without 
compromising either revenue or efficiency (i.e. the total amount of after-tax income available). 
                                                           
4  If indirect taxes are to be set at positive levels, then one also needs the ability to tax all goods, though if some 
goods cannot be taxed, then it would be optimal to have uniform zero indirect taxes, ignoring for the moment the 
other reasons for positive taxes (tourists, minimising tax compliance costs, etc.) 
  2If not, then the current variability of taxes reflects a failure, despite repeated opportunities, to 
further simplify indirect taxes and make them more uniform (which should help compliance, 
reduce collection costs and move towards the preferred EU pattern of taxation). 
  This paper builds on the findings of a recent paper assessing the distributional effects of 
the Greek indirect tax system (Kaplanoglou, 2000). It extends that paper by examining 
efficiency as well as distributional aspects of the current tax system, and by inquiring how the 
present system can be improved. This is done in three ways. The standard theory of marginal tax 
reform (Feldstein, 1972; Ahmad and Stern, 1984; Stern, 1987) can, given sufficient information 
about aggregate demand elasticities, indicate which indirect taxes should be reduced and which 
increased (assuming, as noted above, no other taxes can be changed). The paper applies this 
approach to see whether the current dispersion in tax rates can be defended either on efficiency 
or distributional grounds. We find little support for the current pattern of tax variability even 
within the strong assumptions needed to justify marginal tax reform analysis. 
  The marginal tax reform approach has the attraction of combining both efficiency and 
distributional considerations in a theoretically consistent framework (the same utilitarian 
framework that underlies welfare economics more generally and social cost-benefit analysis in 
particular). It can be embedded in a more comprehensive study of the whole tax and expenditure 
system (although we shall not follow this here), but it has a number of limitations, in addition to 
those noted above. The most serious, and the one that bedevils all arguments for differential 
indirect tax rates, is that it relies on good estimates of own and cross-price elasticities (Deaton, 
1987). There are various responses that can be made to this short-coming, of which the most 
pragmatic is to argue that any case for non-uniformity must either be based on reasonably strong 
evidence that the demand structure justifies it, or that distributional considerations are so 
important that they are likely to dominate the demand-side effects (which, as noted above, is 
hard to do if revenue-neutral lump-sum redistributions can be made). The practical effect of this 
problem is that we can only examine the indirect tax structure at a fairly high level of 
aggregation, which is likely to conceal some important detail. 
  The other limitation is that marginal tax reform analysis only indicates which taxes could 
be raised or lowered to improve matters, not by how much, nor even which ones would deliver 
the best result.
5 That in itself might not be an overwhelming objection if the main purpose is to 
see whether there is any defence for the present departures from uniform taxation, and we are 
able to draw some conclusions from this part of the analysis. Here again the high level of 
aggregation is a limitation, bringing out the importance of excises and other considerations in 
setting these excise tax rates. 
The second way in which this paper explores options for reform is to examine the 
redistributive and efficiency impact of the whole indirect tax system by seeing whether the 
marginal indirect tax rate as a whole varies across the income (or expenditure) distribution in a 
logical and defensible way, following the approach of Newbery and Révész (2000). We find that 
once we correct for household type, there is essentially no variation in the marginal tax rate 
across the income distribution, and hence the individual variability in indirect tax rates is at best 
only redistributing income between different household types at each income level, and has no 
advantage over a more uniform set of indirect tax rates for taxing the rich more heavily than the 
poor. This provides strong evidence that the guiding principle of uniformity of VAT rates within 
a complete tax and benefit system holds even within the more restrictive exercise conducted 
here. 
  This leads to the third way in which we criticise the current structure of indirect taxes, by 
examining the impact of a revenue-neutral tax reform of the entire system. Section 4 investigates 
                                                           
    5 It is tempting to argue that the most socially costly tax rate should be lowered and the least socially costly tax 
should be increased, but if we do not know by how much, and if there are fixed costs to making any changes, then 
their overall net contribution to social welfare may be lower than changing other taxes. 
  3the distributional and efficiency effects of simulating the indirect tax system of the United 
Kingdom on Greek consumers.  This simulation exercise is interesting both in its own right as a 
thought experiment and as an attempt to use as a benchmark a tax system which is already in 
operation in a developed country and seems to be politically sustainable.  Furthermore, it can be 
shown that the UK indirect tax structure can largely be rationalised in terms of optimal 
commodity taxation principles (Kaplanoglou, 1999).  The advantages in terms of reasonableness 
and political relevance of using existing tax systems as comparison benchmarks have been 
recently recognised in the literature; see Gale (1997) and Keen (1997), who discuss the 
implications of aspects of British tax policy for the US.  However, this is the first attempt to put 
this idea in operation within a microsimulation analytical framework.  
 
2.  Marginal tax reform analysis 
Optimal tax theory starts with a description of the economy and the objectives of the 
government, and characterises the optimal level of each of the tax instruments considered 
available, given the information that it is reasonable to assume is available to the government. 
Solving for the set of optimal taxes requires the ability to predict how the economy behaves not 
just in its present equilibrium but at all other possible equilibria, in order to identify the 
optimum. Marginal tax reform analysis also requires an adequate description of the economy 
and government objectives (summarised in a social welfare function), but considers the more 
modest and informationally less demanding task of identifying the direction in which taxes can 
be changed to improve matters, judged by the social welfare function. That requires only local 
information about economic responses to tax changes, in contrast to the global information 
required for determining optimal taxes. A convenient summary of both optimal tax theory and 
the theory of marginal tax reform is supplied by Stern (1987), and applied to the present case 
below. 
 
2.1.  The theory of marginal tax reform 
Suppose that the government ranks distributional outcomes according to a Utilitarian  or 
Benthamite social welfare function W(V
1,...,V
h,...,V
H), where agent h enjoys utility V
h =  
V
h(y
h+g, q) that depends on net income y
h, plus any transfers, g, and the vector of consumer 
prices, q = p + t, where p is the vector of producer prices and t is the vector of indirect taxes.
6  
All we need to assume about the description of the economy is that the producer prices do not 
vary with indirect taxes (defended below). Consider the impact on social welfare of a change in 
consumer price qi, caused by a change in the tax, ti: 
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    6  The force of utilitarianism is that it is individualistic, that is, it respects individual wellbeing as measured by the 
individual utility function, and it is consequentialist, in confining attention to outcomes, rather than processes or 
rights (though these can be included by restrictions on either information or policy variables).  When it comes to 
numerical quantification, individuals are weighted by the OECD equivalence scale.  An agent is then defined as 
one equivalent adult, who is assumed to receive the equivalent share of total household expenditure. 
  4is the social marginal utility of transferring 1 Euro to agent h, x
h
i is consumption of good i by 
agent h, and the last equality in equation (1) makes use of Roy's identity.  The impact of the tax 
change will thus depend on both the level of consumption and its distribution amongst the 
population.  It is convenient to isolate these two effects by defining di, Feldstein's (1972) 
distributional characteristic of good i: 
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where Xi is aggregate consumption of i, β   is the average over the H agents of β
h, so that di is a 
measure of how concentrated the consumption of good i is on the socially deserving (those with 
high social marginal values of consumption, β
h).  The social welfare impact of a price change is 
then 
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  The standard approach to determining desirable directions of tax reform is to compute 
the marginal social cost of raising one Euro of revenue by increasing the indirect tax on the ith 
good. On the standard assumption that the tax is 100% shifted forward to the final price (this is 
the force of assuming that producer prices do not vary with taxes),
7 the impact on social welfare 
is MW/Mti, while the extra revenue collected is MR/Mti, where R = ΣtiXi is total tax revenue. The 
extra revenue collected is then 
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where ωi is the budget share of good i, qiXi/ΣqiXi , τi = ti/qi  is the ratio of the indirect tax to the 
tax-inclusive price, and εki is the cross price elasticity of good k with respect to the price of good 
i (or the tax ti). 
  In order to collect one more Euro of tax, the tax rate will have to be increased by 
1/MR/Mti, so the marginal social cost of raising a Euro of tax is 
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This expression is rather inelegant, and its inverse can be more readily examined. Define the 
marginal social tax productivity of tax i as the extra revenue collected for a unit increase in 
social pain, -MW/Mti, θi: 
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    7 This assumption can be defended theoretically for a competitive constant returns economy, or for an imperfectly 
competitive economy (Lockwood, 1988; Stern, 1987), and empirically in the case of Greece (Karageorgas, 1973; 
Karageorgas and Pakos, 1988). 
  5where fi = 1/di is the inverse of the distributional characteristic of good i, and may be termed the 
tax appeal of good i, the extent to which it is well targeted on the consumption of the better off. 
  Equation (7) can now be interpreted. The marginal social productivity of taxing good i 
increases with the tax appeal of the good, is reduced the higher is the product of the tax rate on 
the good with the (absolute) value of the own price elasticity, εii, and is further influenced by 
other taxes and cross-price elasticities, εki. High own price elasticities signal that the 
distortionary cost of raising revenue by tax increases as the tax rate rises, but this may be 
counterbalanced by the equity considerations represented by the good's tax appeal, fi. 
  Unfortunately, the direction of reform depends to a considerable extent on the values of 
the elasticities, εki, that are hard to estimate. Deaton (1987) argues that their values are often 
largely predetermined by the choice of demand system in any econometric estimation. For 
example, the Linear Expenditure System (LES) has zero (uncompensated) cross-price 
elasticities, so that (7) then reduces to 
                (7a)  () .       +     f   =   ii i i i ε τ θ 1
If we ignore distributional considerations, this is the familiar Ramsey rule that argues that 
indirect taxes should be inversely proportional to the (absolute) value of the price elasticity. 
Goods that are price inelastic should be more heavily taxed. 
  If instead of assuming additive separability (of which the LES is a special case), we 
assume indirect additivity (Houthakker, 1960: Deaton, 1987), then (7) reduces to 
  ()  ,   +     )   +   (   -        A     ,   )   -   (     -   A   f   =   j j j
j
i i i i τ ε ω τ ξ ξ ε τ θ ∑ ≡ 1 1          (7b) 
and where εi > ξ is the expenditure elasticity of good i, and ξ is a parameter to be estimated.  In 
this case, ignoring distributional considerations, indirect taxes should be inversely proportional 
to the adjusted expenditure elasticity, (εi - ξ ), and income inelastic goods should be more 
heavily taxed. There is a close relation between these two formula, as Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980a, p139) point out, for additivity implies Pigou's Law, namely that price elasticities are 
likely to be roughly proportional to income elasticities in the case of additivity (and a reasonable 
degree of commodity disaggregation). It also reminds us that goods that on efficiency grounds 
are attractive for higher indirect taxes (low price or income elasticities of demand) are likely to 
be unattractive on distributional grounds (low income elasticities, i.e. necessities consumed by 
the poor). These two opposing factors are captured by fi and the various elasticities, as in (7a) 
and (7b).  
  The conflict between equity and efficiency can be demonstrated for the special case of 
constant expenditure elasticities εi, and a log-normal distribution of expenditure (which is a 
reasonable approximation to the actual expenditure distribution in the case of most countries). 
The tax appeal of good i can be written as EβExi/{E[βxi]), where Exi is the expected or average 
value of xi over the whole population. If the log of expenditure is normally distributed with a 
mean µ and variance σ , then 
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where the last equality comes from the properties of the lognormal distribution (see e.g. 
Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981, p89).  It follows that 
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and the values of fi are a simple function of, and will be correlated with, the expenditure 
elasticities. A high value of εi will give a high value of fi but from (7b) on efficiency grounds 
should have a low tax. 
 
2.2.  Estimation  
In order to apply this theoretical framework to the Greek case, we have to combine 
information from different sources.  Household expenditure data are readily available from 
cross-section microdata of the 1987/8 Household Expenditure Survey (HES).  The sample 
consists of 6,489 households, is representative of the population
8 and provides information on 
household expenditure on 293 categories of goods and services.  The indirect tax rates (τi = 
ti/qi) were computed on the basis of taxes on final goods. This was particularly time-
consuming, given the complicated structure of indirect taxation, which involves a large 
number of taxes levied on different commodities at various rates, sometimes in a cascaded 
manner.
9   
Demand derivatives and elasticities can be obtained from estimates of aggregate demand 
systems.  Since there is effectively no price variation in the HES data, we draw on two recent 
time series estimates of complete demand systems for Greece.
10 The first, by Andrikopoulos 
et al (1992), contains an estimation of the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) for Greece 
for thirteen commodity groups based on National Accounts time series data for the period 
1958-1986.  The second study was conducted by Alogoskoufis et al (1996) and involves 
again an estimation of the AIDS for Greece for nine commodity groups using annual time 
series data for the period 1970-1990. 
The AIDS is considered a sufficiently flexible demand system, allowing second-order 
flexible functional forms for the preference representation functions and, thus, provides 
consistent estimates of price and income elasticities. It has the additional advantage of not 
entirely pre-determining the direction of tax reform, as would the simpler Linear Expenditure 
System (Deaton, 1987). In both studies, to conform with the constraints implied by classical 
demand theory, the adding-up condition, homogeneity and Slutsky symmetry restrictions 
have been imposed on the share equations. The results of the two studies, although based on 
the same demand specification, are not directly comparable, since they refer to different time 
periods, the commodity classifications are not identical and they reflect different estimation 
methods –see Table A2 in the Appendix. 
The marginal social tax productivities, θi, are calculated for both sets of elasticity 
estimates from the two studies, in order to test for the sensitivity of results to the different 
demand derivative estimates.  The number of commodity groups handled in this framework is 
therefore restricted to the level of commodity aggregation of these two studies.  We require 
that the price elasticities satisfy the budget constraint for the 1987/8 HES data.  Thus, the 
elasticities matrices of the two studies have been adjusted so that they satisfy the 1987/8 HES 
vector of shares of consumer expenditure.  This is done as in Ahmad and Stern (1984), where 
  7
                                                           
8 In fact, various dimensions of the representativity of the HES sample have been checked against macro-
variables from other sources and results are very satisfactory, thus guaranteeing the quality of the results, see 
Kaplanoglou (1999). 
9 For a detailed description of the calculation of tax rates see Kaplanoglou (1999). 
10 This approach is common in such studies: see for example the original article by Ahmad and Stern (1984), 
Madden (1989) and Decoster and Schokkaert (1989). adjusted elasticities, ε
* are chosen by minimising the distance, S, between the original and  
the adjusted  elasticity matrices,  where  S ≡ ε
*- ε and we minimise: 
 
  ∑ − =
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* ε    (8) 
where w is the vector of the HES shares of consumer expenditure. 
  Finally, we need a method to calculate the welfare weights β
h that allows us to 
experiment with differing value judgements about the importance of distributional 
considerations. The simplest and most easily parameterised approach is given by the iso-elastic 




1-ν/(1-ν), (ν ≠ 1), 
u
h = log c
h, (ν = 1), where ν is Atkinson's (1970) coefficient of inequality aversion.  Then for an 




-ν. The higher is the value of ν, 
the more concerned the government is with inequality.  Thus, if ν = 1, transferring one Euro to 
someone at double the living standard of another has a social value of only one-half that of the 
reference person. A value of  zero indicates no inequality aversion, in which case β
h would be 
the same for all households, while at the other extreme, a value of 5 approaches the Rawlsian 
“maxi-min” principle in which only the impact on the poorest counts (for if ν = 5, a marginal 
unit of income to the poorest is worth 2
5 = 32 times the value of a unit to someone with twice 
that income). 
Table 1 presents the θi s, as well as their components as presented in equation (7), of 
different commodity groups and the corresponding ranks, for five different degrees of 
inequality aversion (ν=0, 0.5, 1, 2 or 5).  The interpretation of ranking followed here is that a 
commodity group with a lower rank (say 12) is preferred to a commodity ranked higher (say 
1) as candidate of additional taxation – i.e. low ranks mean lower taxes.  In the same table we 
present the tax appeal values fi (the inverse of the distributional characteristics, di) of the 
commodity groups and the corresponding ranks for different values of the inequality aversion 
parameter.  Again commodity groups with high tax appeal are potential candidates for higher 
tax rates.  If we do not care about equity (ν = 0), they are equal to one.  The fis for the other 
levels of inequality aversion indicate directions of reform for a government that is willing to 
trade off efficiency for equity.  
From Table 1 is apparent that the existing tax structure is not optimal for any of the 
levels of ν chosen, since θi s differ across commodities.  Desirable directions of tax reform 
are moderately sensitive to the coefficient of inequality aversion. If government cares little or 
nothing about redistribution (ν = 0 to 0.5), one would propose raising taxes on 
communication, health, education, and possibly furniture and food, and decreasing taxes on 
recreation (including durables related to entertainment such as TV sets, hi-fi stereo systems), 
transport, alcohol and housing using the elasticities by Andrikopoulos et al (1992). The 
results are not very different using the elasticities from Alogoskoyfis et al (1996), taking into 
account the difference in the number of commodity groups. For the latter set of elasticities, 
for example, taxes on communication, furniture and possibly food are to be raised, while 
taxes on alcohol, tobacco, housing and transport should be lowered. 
The introduction of inequality concerns allows the working of the marginal reform 
framework to be demonstrated.  One can notice that distributionally sensitive commodities, 
for example food, communication and heating move from moderately high ranks (indicating 
that taxes should perhaps be raised) for zero or low values of inequality aversion to lower 
ranks (lower taxes). On the other hand, the table indicates that commodity groups like 
transport, clothing and alcohol that have low ranks on efficiency considerations (ν = 0), 
become more attractive candidates for additional taxation when the government strongly 
cares about redistribution.  Some goods, such as tobacco and housing (which have low 
ranks), and education (high rank), hardly change their position regardless of how averse to 
  8inequality the government is. Furthermore, the general tendencies do not seem to demonstrate 
strong sensitivity to the set of elasticities used, taking into account the differences in 
commodity groups, and in this respect can be considered robust. 
As the level of inequality aversion increases, the ranking of the θi’s tends to approximate 
the ranking of tax appeal, see Table 1.  Closer inspection of the table, however, suggests that 
in general the rankings of the θi s are dominated by the efficiency element.  The introduction 
of distributional considerations at low levels of ν does not significantly affect the ranking of 
the θi’s and it is only at high values of ν that significant changes in the ranking occur.  This 
result supports the finding by Decoster and Schokkaert (1989), who demonstrate a similar 
result for Belgium.  The authors conclude that this is an indication that consumption patterns 
are not sufficiently differentiated to ascribe an important redistributive role to indirect taxes, a 
problem theoretically analysed in Sah (1983). Part of the problem is the high degree of 
aggregation forced by the need to estimate cross-price elasticities, as this tends to obscure 
variations in consumption patterns (and also variations in tax rates within the commodity 
groups). However, the conclusion that the indirect tax system is not particularly well-suited 
for redistribution is well taken, and was argued above. Equity considerations are better 
addressed using direct taxes and even more by the expenditure side of the budget. 
The marginal tax results presented in Table 1 should be further qualified before they can 
be used to guide policy. Before listing the theoretical limitations of the approach, it is worth 
applying some elementary common sense to the prescriptions that appear to emerge from the 
analysis. Thus tobacco, which on efficiency and equity grounds would appear to require 
lower taxation, is heavily taxed in most countries to discourage use of an addictive and 
harmful product.
11  In the case of alcohol, which is quite heavily taxed (compared to the 
average tax rate, though not compared to other EU countries), and on efficiency grounds 
appears to warrant a tax reduction, is also taxed to discourage consumption, though here the 
externalities are more obvious (road accidents, battered wives and children, etc.). Similarly, 
taxing education may appear similarly attractive, but ignores merit good case of beneficial 
externalities (to children, in reduced crime, etc.)  Transport fuels are frequently heavily taxed 
as a user charge for the public road system, and the pure tax element is considerably smaller 
than shown in the table. Replacing the nominal tax rate with the amount above the user 
charge element would greatly weaken the argument for lowering that tax. Similarly, the 
apparently low tax on food which on efficiency grounds is a reason for some increase, 
ignores the heavy implicit tax on consumers caused by the Common Agricultural Policy. 
What this suggests is that a simpler indirect tax system would distinguish between corrective 
or user charge excises (on alcohol, tobacco, fuel), and a small number of VAT rates to deal 
with other goods (the lower or zero rate being retained for food, education and other goods 
which are deemed for various reasons to require lower taxes). 
At the more theoretical level, we have already noted that marginal analysis does not 
allow any conclusions on the desirable magnitude of the changes proposed in the rate 
structure.  Furthermore, the assumption of fixed incomes implicitly imposes weak 
separability between goods and leisure, which we noted argues for uniform taxation.  When 
combined with the ability to impose an optimal non-linear income tax, the optimal indirect 
tax system is one of uniform taxes, so that the whole marginal reform analysis becomes 
unnecessary.  Marginal indirect tax reform analysis then requires not only the non-optimality 
of the income tax structure, but also strong limits to redistributing tax revenue through lump-
sum transfers. 
                                                           
11  The argument that it should be taxed to pay for the subsidised medical treatment that smokers may need 
ignores the larger saving in publicly funded pension payments caused by their premature death. 
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θi ( for ν=0) 








for i≠k      
(5) 
fi 
*: tax appeal for various inequality aversion (ν) 
(rank in italics) 
(6) 
θi
*  for various inequality aversion (ν)  
(rank in italics) 
(7)=(3)*(6) 
     ν  =     0.5  1  2  5  ν  =     0.5  1      2 5
Andrikopoulos et al (1992)           
Recreation/Entertainment 3.6%          1 0.352 -0.299 -0.349 1.05 10  1.10  9  1.18  9  1.48  11  0.44  1  0.46  1  0.50  1  0.63  7 
Alcohol 0.7%    2  0.429  -0.061 -0.510  1.03 8  1.05  7  1.05  6  0.90  7  0.53  2  0.54  2  0.54  3  0.47  5 
Transport      10.3% 3  0.574  -0.216 -0.210  1.06 11  1.12  11  1.27  11  1.45  10  0.73  5  0.77  6  0.87  8  1.01  9 
Housing      5.9% 4  0.616  -0.034 -0.350  0.94 4  0.88  4  0.74  4  0.42  4  0.70  3  0.65  3  0.55  5  0.31  2 
Tobacco      2.6% 5  0.669  -0.222 -0.110  0.91 2  0.82  2  0.66  2  0.39  2  0.73  4  0.66  4  0.53  2  0.31  3 
Heating/Lighting      4.3%  6 0.755  -0.012 -0.232 0.90  1  0.80  1  0.60  1  0.16  1  0.81  6  0.72  5  0.54  4  0.15  1 
Clothing      14.3% 7  0.866  -0.159 0.025  1.05 9  1.10  10  1.21  10  1.97  12  1.09  9  1.14  9  1.26  9  2.07  12 
Other goods and services  7.4%  8  0.872  -0.055 -0.072  1.08  13  1.15  13  1.32  13  2.02  13  1.12  10  1.20  10  1.37  11  2.13  13 
Food 29.9%  9  0.897  -0.005 -0.098  0.94  0.87  3  3  0.74  3  0.40  3  1.01  7  0.94  7  0.80  6  0.43  4 
Communication      1.4% 10 0.923  -0.053 -0.024  0.95  5  0.90  5  0.78  5  0.56  5  1.05  8  0.99  8  0.87  7  0.62  6 
Furniture      9.1% 11  1.014  -0.011 0.025  1.03 7  1.05  6  1.08  7  0.70  6  1.24  11  1.27  11  1.32  10  0.86  8 
Health    7.3% 12  1.070  -0.079 0.148  1.08  1.15  12  12  1.28  12  1.20  8  1.38  13  1.47  13  1.64  13  1.55  10 
Education      3.1% 13  1.111  -0.010 0.121  1.03 6  1.05  8  1.12  8  1.23  9  1.36  12  1.40  12  1.49  12  1.66  11 
Weighted  average                                   100.0% 0.836 -0.078 -0.086 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
 
             Alogoskouifs et al (1996) 
 
                         
Alcohol      0.7% 1  0.363  -0.269 -0.368  1.03 7  1.05  7  1.05  6  0.93  7  0.46  1  0.47  1  0.46  2  0.41  4 
Tobacco      2.6% 2  0.556  -0.317 -0.128  0.91 2  0.82  2  0.66  2  0.39  2  0.61  2  0.56  2  0.45  1  0.27  2 
Transport      10.3% 3  0.690  -0.239 -0.071  1.06 8  1.12  9  1.27  9  1.49  8  0.89  5  0.94  7  1.07  7  1.24  8 
Housing      5.9% 4  0.767  -0.017 -0.216  0.94 4  0.88  4  0.75  4  0.43  4  0.88  4  0.82  4  0.69  4  0.40  3 
Heating/Lighting        4.3% 5 0.769  -0.102 -0.129 0.90  1  0.80  1  0.60  1  0.17  1  0.84  3  0.75  3  0.56  3  0.16  1 
Food 29.9%  6  0.827  -0.011 -0.162  0.94  0.87  3  3  0.75  3  0.41  3  0.94  6  0.88  5  0.75  5  0.41  5 
Communication      1.4% 7 0.840  -0.068 -0.092  0.95  5  0.90  5  0.78  5  0.57  5  0.98  7  0.92  6  0.80  6  0.58  6 
Other goods and services  35.9%  8  0.860  -0.048 -0.092  1.06  9  1.12  8  1.23  8  1.68  9  1.11  8  1.17  8  1.29  9  1.75  9 
Furniture 9.1%    9  0.942  -0.079 0.021  1.03 6  1.05  6  1.09  7  0.72  6  1.18  9  1.21  9  1.24  8  0.82  7 
Weighted average  100.0%    0.819  -0.069 -0.112  1.00    1.00    1.00                  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: ranked by efficiency. lowest score merits lower tax.    
* Divided by the weighted average of the respective column. 
  113.  Disincentive effects of indirect taxation 
The inefficiency of a tax depends on its marginal rate (and on various elasticities), as this 
determines its disincentive effect. That concept is familiar in the case of personal income 
taxes, but applies just as much to indirect taxes as a whole. Here the appropriate concept is 
the marginal indirect tax rate, defined as the extra indirect tax paid on additional goods 
purchased when income (or expenditure) increases by one unit. If this marginal rate is 
constant over the income or expenditure distribution, then there is no distributional case for 
departures from uniformity. In this section we explore the cross-sectional characteristics of 
the marginal indirect tax rate. 
 
3.1 Two models of marginal indirect tax rates 
The marginal indirect tax rate is the weighted sum of indirect taxes on different goods, 
weighted by the marginal expenditure shares of the goods (for an application see Newbery 
and Révész, 2000). The marginal expenditure shares can be estimated given some estimable 
form of individual preferences (for example, the linear expenditure system or the AIDS). This 
is readily done by estimating the marginal indirect tax rates as a direct function of 
expenditure, given a suitable functional specification.  Two alternative formulations of the 
relationship are adopted, one corresponding to the Linear Expenditure System, or LES 
(Stone, 1954) and the other to the AIDS (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b).  More precisely, 
according to the LES, Engel curves take the form:  
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where, using the same notation as before, qi
h
i x  is equivalent expenditure on good i, y
h is 
income (or total expenditure) of household h (again by equivalent adult), y
h
0 is subsistence 
expenditure, and Σαi = 1.  The formula for total tax collected from household h is: 
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where T
h is total taxes paid by household h (per equivalent adult) and τi is the tax rate on 
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Differentiating (11) with respect to expenditure, y
h, gives the marginal indirect tax rate, B
h = 
Στi αi , a constant that does not vary with the level of expenditure. 
Where prices do not vary, the Almost Ideal Demand System gives the non-linear 
Working-Leser Engel curve, developed by Working (1943) and Leser (1963). It takes the 
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where   is again the share of expenditure by household h on good i, y
h
i w
h is defined as before, 
and Σαi = 1, Σδi = 0. The Working-Leser Engel curve gives rise to a different functional 
form of the tax equation, as follows: 
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  12Differentiating (13) with respect to expenditure, y
h, gives the marginal indirect tax rate as 
T
h/y
h + Σδiτi , so that the value of Σδiτi describe departures from the average.
12 
Marginal indirect tax rates were estimated on the basis of equations (11) and (13) across 
the expenditure distribution, in a first stage not controlling, and in a second stage controlling, 
for demographics.
13  More precisely, in the first stage the household expenditure distribution 
was split in quintiles of equivalent non-durable expenditure and equations (11) and (13) were 
estimated for each group.  Demographics were not controlled for, as the principal aim at this 
stage was to calculate the marginal indirect tax rates faced on average by the Greek 
consumers of the given demographic and other status characteristics on the basis of their 
position in the expenditure distribution alone. 
In the second stage, equations (11) and (13) were also estimated across the total 
household sample controlling for demographic and other status characteristics.  The latter 
were allowed to influence the intercept of the tax equation, but not its slope.
14  The estimated 
equations appear in Table A3 in Appendix A and allow the calculation of marginal indirect 
tax rates across the expenditure distribution holding demographic composition and other 
socio-economic characteristics constant.  In the present context, marginal indirect tax rates 
were calculated on the basis of the estimated equations for the average values of non-durable 
equivalent expenditure for each quintile for two “representative” household types,
15 i.e. a 
married couple with two children living in Athens in own accommodation, where the head 
belongs to the 26-50 age group, is an employee in the private sector and has high school 
education (household type A) and a childless couple living in own accommodation in Athens, 
the head is a pensioner over 65 years old and has basic or no education (household type B).  
Finally it should be noted that the Working-Leser model produces a more realistic picture of 
the relation between paid taxes and expenditure, since it captures non-linearities in this 
relation.  The LES, by forcing a linear relationship between taxes and expenditure, in general 



























W-L (grossed-up) LES (grossed-up)
  
Figure 1.   Marginal indirect tax rates – all households 
                                                           
12 It should be noted that in all estimated equations y
h corresponds as before to non-durable items.  The 
parameters were scaled up to reflect the share of non-durable expenditure in total expenditure. 
13 All estimated regressions were tested for the presence of multicollinearity, hetero-skedasticity and the 
existence of outliers.  Unless otherwise stated, the estimated equations passed the tests of multicollinearity and 
the existence of outliers.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent estimators were obtained using White’s method - see 
MacKinnon and White (1985). 
14 The reason was the severe multicollinearity introduced in the Working-Leser type model of equation (13) 
through the introduction of interaction terms between the logarithm of expenditure and the socio-economic 
dummies. This, however, is not a very important compromise, since the marginal indirect tax rates are allowed 
to vary across socio-economic groups through the average indirect tax rate component. 
15 One can in principle estimate marginal tax rates for any combination of the demographic and other status 
dummies. 
  13Figure-1 shows the variation in marginal tax rates across quintiles of non-durable 
expenditure for the total sample.  As explained before, separate regressions were run for each 
quintile so that the figures presented refer to the actual marginal indirect tax rates faced by 
the Greek consumers in each quintile given their socio-economic structure.  This variation is 
non-negligible and statistically significant, in terms of the deviations from the values of the 
middle quintile. 
If, however, the socio-demographic structure is controlled for, marginal indirect tax rates 
become surprisingly uniform.  Most of the variation in average and marginal indirect tax rates 
seems to be captured by demographic and socio-economic characteristics, rather than the 
expenditure level itself - note in Table A3 that the estimated expenditure coefficient is 
positive and significant, but very small in magnitude for the LES, and negative and not 
statistically significant for the W-L model.  This is verified in Figures 2a-b, which present the 
marginal indirect tax rates for the two “representative” household types described above. 
 









































































The main conclusion is that when the demographic and other status characteristics of the 
households are controlled for, the marginal indirect tax rates are fairly constant across the 
expenditure distribution, i.e. the actual tax system creates the same marginal indirect tax rates 
that a uniform indirect tax system would create, but nevertheless is much more distortionary 
since it comprises of many different taxes charged at varying rates (see appendix table A1).  
Therefore, the present indirect tax system, judged on purely efficiency grounds, is 




4.  Simulating the UK indirect tax system on Greek consumers: evaluation of an 
alternative tax structure 
 
4.1. The simulation methodology 
The UK indirect tax structure is substantially simpler than the Greek one.  It involves a 
standard VAT rate applicable to most expenditure items, a lower rate (mainly for domestic 
energy), with certain goods zero-rated (for example food) or exempt, coupled with special 
excises on certain goods, notably tobacco, alcohol, petrol and diesel.  What the replacement 
of the Greek indirect tax system by this system would broadly imply is the elimination of 
VAT on most food items, children’s clothing, medicines, books, newspapers and transport, 
which are currently taxed at the low VAT rate, with the notable exception of domestic energy 
  14
                                                           
16 Note that uniformity of tax rates would result in a similar overall patterns of marginal tax rates, but would 
involve gainers and losers, especially among different demographic groups. and heating oil, which attract high tax rates, rather than the reduced UK rate.
17 Goods 
currently subject to excises (cars, petrol, alcohol and tobacco) would attract new rates of 
duty.  Car purchase taxes would dramatically fall and their variability according to engine 
power would not be retained and neither would the variability of transport dues.  Excises on 
petrol would marginally increase and there would also be an increase in the tax rate of 
tobacco.  At the same time, the marginal increase of the standard VAT rate  to around 19% or 
22% depending on the assumption about behavioural responses, would increase the tax rate 
on a broad range of commodities (for example furniture and clothing) taxed under the 
standard VAT rate in both systems. 
We assume, as before, that producer prices are constant and indirect tax changes are 
fully reflected on consumer prices.  In the absence of own- and cross-price elasticities 
estimated for a sufficiently detailed level of commodity disaggregation, two extremes of 
behavioural response to the resulting change in the retail price of commodities can be 
modelled.  One scenario assumes that the purchased quantity of a commodity remains 
constant and corresponds to zero own-price elasticity.  Final expenditure changes and hence 
the household budget constraint might be violated (if treated as a static given, though not 
necessarily in an intertemporal context), so this sort of analysis better describes the short-run 
impact of the policy change.  The alternative scenario assumes constant expenditure for each 
good, which implies that the quantity bought changes and corresponds to an own-price 
elasticity of -1.
18  In both cases no cross-price effects are modelled.  The use of extreme 
assumptions about household behaviour is particularly appropriate, since it provides some 
kind of ‘confidence interval’ for the results. 
We need to identify tax payments at a commodity level associated with the Greek and 
the UK tax regime.  Following the notation of section 2, assume that before the tax change, 
indirect tax payments at a commodity level (tx) and the tax rate as a percentage of the 
consumer price (t/q or τ) are given (dropping subscripts) by: 
 







= = = τ .    (14) 
As explained in section 2, we have information on household expenditure data for around 
6,500 households and 293 commodities (qx) and we have also calculated the tax rates (τ).  
Indirect tax payments can be derived from (14) as tx = qxτ. 
Under the UK tax regime, indirect tax payments at a commodity level depend on the 
assumption about the behavioural responses of households.  Under the constant quantity 
















= ′ τ ,         ( 1 5 )  
where τ  is the tax rate of the commodity under the UK tax regime, t   is the amount of tax 
per unit of the commodity under the UK tax regime, q  is the new consumer price, p is the 
unchanged producer price, x is the constant purchased quantity of the goods, px is the 
unchanged pre-tax expenditure on the commodity under the UK tax regime and  x is the 
new total expenditure on the commodity after the tax change.  After simple algebraic 
manipulations, we derive the following formula for the calculation of the new amount of tax 







                                                           
17  To simplify, we only consider a two-rate VAT, and assign goods in the lower (5%) rate to the zero rate band. 
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x t .       ( 1 6 )  
In the constant expenditure scenario, matters are simpler and the new amount of tax paid is 
(where notation as before): 
  .        ( 1 7 )   τ′ = ′ ′ ) (qx x t
Note that the standard UK VAT rate has been scaled up so that the tax reform is an equal-
yield one and has no impact on total government revenue.  This results in an upward 
adjustment of the VAT rate to 22.3% in the constant expenditure scenario and 19.2% in the 
constant quantity scenario. 
 
4.2. Distributional effects 
The result of replacing the Greek by the UK indirect tax system for the tax shares of different 
commodity groups is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.   Implications of the tax reform for the structure of indirect tax revenue. 
 
 Greek  system  UK system  
(constant expenditure) 
UK system  
(constant quantity) 
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     5.0% 
 
9.8 
Alcohol  33.6%  1.5 53.2% 2.4 50.1% 3.0 
Tobacco  67.6%       11.8  78.9%       13.8  75.9%       17.9 
Clothing/Footwear  13.8%       13.3  14.6%       14.1  13.4%       12.7 
Housing   10.8%  6.3       8.9%  5.2       9.4%  5.1 
Central Heating  44.0%  4.4       0.0%  0.0       0.0%  0.0 
Household.goods  13.5%  8.2  18.2%       11.0  16.1%       10.0 
Medical        1.0%  0.3       0.0%  0.0       0.0%  0.0 
Personal  Care  12.1%  1.7 18.2% 2.6 16.1% 2.4 
Education        0.5%  0.1       1.6%  0.2       1.6%  0.2 
Recreation  15.6%  5.2 14.3% 4.7 12.6% 4.1 
Transport  44.0%       30.3  36.9%       26.1  40.3%       23.2 
Communication  13.5%  1.2 17.9% 1.6 15.8% 1.5 
Other        7.6%  3.8  16.7%  8.4  18.2%       10.1 
 















As expected, revenues from food, housing, heating fuel and transport have substantially 
declined.  This fall is counterbalanced by an increase in revenues from alcohol, tobacco, 
household durables and ‘other goods’. 
The replacement of the Greek indirect tax system with the UK one is positively 
judged on equity grounds, since the distribution of tax gains and losses across deciles of the 
population is progressive regardless of the assumptions on behavioural responses, see Figure 
3.
19  In this figure, much information is concealed, since within each decile certain 
households gain or lose different amounts. 
                                                           
19 The household welfare indicator, used to rank households, is deflated equivalent pre-reform expenditure on 

























































































deciles of equi. non-durable expenditure (pre-reform)
Percentage change in taxes(UKce-GR) Percentage change in taxes(UKcq-GR)
*Difference in taxes as a percentage of the pre-reform total household expenditure (including 
taxes).
 
Figure 3.    Percentage change in taxes paid





























































































































































Gains and losses 
  
Figure 4.    Proportions of each decile gaining/loosing certain amounts, in percentages of total initial 
expenditure  (constant expenditure assumption) 
 
The mixed pattern of gainers and losers is displayed graphically in Figure 4,
20 which 
shows the proportions of each decile losing or gaining certain amounts as a percentage of 
their total pre-reform expenditure.  The bars near the front represent poorer deciles with the 
top deciles against the back wall.  Bars on the left show large gainers, those on the right show 
large losers.  From Figure 4 is apparent that losers are concentrated to the top deciles, with 
small proportions of large losers in the bottom deciles, while there are some exceptions to the 
norm in each decile of expenditure.  If we seek to explain the progressive pattern of tax gains 
and losses, the zero-rating of food, medicines, domestic energy and domestic fuel, and the 
                                                           
20 For reasons of space constraints, results are displayed only for the constant expenditure scenario, but are 
qualitatively the same for the constant quantity case. 
  17increase in the tax rate on eating out, household durables and personal care, have a 
considerable progressive effect, which is not matched by the regressive effect of the increase 
of the tax rate on tobacco and the large decrease in the tax rate of cars and their use. 
The equity impact of replacing the Greek tax system with the UK on the whole 
expenditure distribution can also be explored by comparing the Lorenz curves under the two 
tax regimes.  Figure 5 shows the two curves and their difference is measured on the right 
axis.  The Lorenz curve of the after-UK tax expenditure lies closer to the 45˚ line of equality 
and actually dominates the curve of after-Greek tax expenditure, indicating clearly that the 
UK indirect tax system results in a more equitable after-tax distribution than the Greek one. 
Finally the improvement in the targeting of the indirect tax system towards the ‘socially 
deserving’ is confirmed in Table 3, which shows the correlation coefficients between the tax 
rates of commodities and their distributional characteristics using as weights the budget 
shares of commodities.  We use various values of the inequality aversion parameter in order 
to capture different possible government preferences on inequality.  A negative value of the 
correlation coefficient would be desirable in the sense that distributionally sensitive 
commodities bear relatively lower taxes.  These values are negative but not statistically 


























Figure 5.    Lorenz curves of expenditure distributions under Greek and UK 
 
Table 3.    Correlation coefficients between distributional characteristics and tax rates: 
comparison of the UK and the Greek indirect tax system. 
 
Values of the Pearson correlation coefficient 




< = 0.5 
 
< = 1 
 
< = 2 
 
< = 5 
 












































*Commodities have been weighted by their budget share. 
 Significance probability that the statistic is 0 in parenthesis. Significant statistics at the 5% in bold. 
 
  18significant under the UK tax simulation experiment, suggesting that on the whole the UK tax 
system treats distributionally sensitive commodities more favourably than the Greek one. 
 
4.3 Marginal indirect tax rates under the UK tax reform: disincentive effects 
The UK tax simulation experiment can be judged on purely efficiency grounds by estimating 
the indirect taxes paid at the margin along the expenditure distribution.  The methodology for 
calculating marginal indirect tax rates has already been described in section 3.  Results are 
presented for the ‘constant expenditure’ scenario, but are qualitatively the same for the 

























W-L (grossed-up) LES (grossed-up)
 
Figure 6.    Marginal indirect tax rates in UK tax simulation experiment – all households 
. 
Figure 6 shows that marginal indirect tax rates are rather variable across household 
quintiles of expenditure when the demographic structure is not controlled for.  However, 
controlling for demographic and other status characteristics presents a quite different picture.  
For the Greek tax system, marginal tax rates were approximately uniform across the 
expenditure distribution for the two representative household types described in section 3. 
 






































































Figures 7a-b.    Marginal indirect tax rates in UK tax simulation experiment  
 
This provided a direct argument for simplifying the indirect tax structure.  For the UK tax 
structure, the estimation of the proportion of taxes paid at the margin for the same household 
types shows a clear increasing pattern, see Figures 7a and b.  The same result is reinforced by 
  19the econometric analysis of Table A4.  Whether this pattern is optimal can hardly be 
established given current theoretical knowledge and data, and as we have seen, marginal tax 
analysis is of little help in answering this question.  
 
4.4 Lessons from the UK tax simulation experiment 
The UK simulation experiment shows how a country’s rather successful experience on 
certain policy problems can be useful for another country.  Although the UK tax structure 
disposes several features which supposedly enhance the progressivity of the tax system albeit 
at the expense of adding to its complexity, it results in an unambiguously more equitable 
after-tax distribution, while the relative gains of such tax reform accrue in larger proportions 
to poorer households.  Furthermore, efficiency arguments based on marginal indirect tax rate 
analysis no longer point to a simplification of the indirect tax structure, as was the case with 
the Greek indirect tax system. 
However, microsimulation analysis should be viewed only as part of the social 
calculation required to assess what is desirable or in fact can be achieved in practice.  Certain 
further aspects of a tax reform should be considered.  The closed and static nature of 
microsimulation analysis does not allow the study of general equilibrium effects, for example 
the effects resulting from changing employment opportunities in the different sectors of the 
economy, frontier trade, macro-economic effects and so on.  In the case of the UK tax 
simulation experiment, these effects are hard to predict especially because the changes 
entailed are far from small.  The most prominent example is the enormous increase in wine 
taxation, which would severely affect consumption patterns and the behaviour of the large 
number of wine producers, for example in terms of providing incentives for illegal activities, 
tax evasion and smuggling. 
Another aspect of the tax reform so far ignored is its impact on the costs of the 
administration and compliance mechanisms.  The administrative (publicly carried) and 
compliance (privately carried) costs of taxation are an important dimension of the quality of a 
tax system (Slemrod, 1990).  An indirect tax structure which is complicated and in a state of 
flux, like the Greek one, is much more costly to administer, since information is processed 
slowly, audits are infrequent, resulting in lax tax enforcement and low compliance.
21  Thus, a 
reduction in the number and rates of taxes, as would be the case in the potential scenario of 
replacing the Greek indirect tax structure with the UK one, would be welcome since it would 
normally minimise administrative complexity and hence minimise both administrative costs 
for the revenue authorities and compliance costs for traders. 
On the other hand, in order to keep total revenue from indirect taxes unchanged, the 
standard VAT rate was adjusted to considerably higher than present levels.  Higher VAT 
rates would create stronger incentives for tax evasion and would potentially call for higher 
spending on tax administration and enforcement mechanisms.  On the other hand, keeping the 
UK standard VAT rate (17.5%) would result in a decrease in total revenue collected by about 
10-12%, depending on behavioural responses.  Increased international tax competition of 
more mobile tax bases renders the shifting of taxation towards certain other sources, e.g. 
capital, problematic.  On the other hand, a decrease in tax revenue would not be sustainable 
for Greece at least at present, when revenue collection is crucial under increased pressures for 
restricting the public deficit, in line with the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth 
Pact.  This does not diminish the role of the British tax experience for Greece, it just needs to 
be clarified that Greece could potentially benefit most by replicating the much simpler and 
more transparent UK indirect tax structure, if it also replicated other desirable parts of the UK 
                                                           
21 For empirical evidence on the negative relationship between the number of VAT rates and VAT compliance 
in OECD countries see Agha and Haughton (1996).  For an excellent account of the relation between tax reform 
and tax administration in Greece, see Rapanos (1997). 
  20tax and expenditure system, that is a more substantial redistributive role for the expenditure 
side of the budget, increased efficiency in the collection of direct taxes and, thus, a lower 
reliance on indirect taxation for redistribution and especially revenue collection. 
 
5. Concluding  remarks 
The indirect tax system in Greece has been the historical outcome of the efforts of 
governments to use it both as the main revenue-raising device and as a tool for redistribution. 
This has created a tax structure which is unnecessarily complicated and inefficient without 
achieving any noticeably beneficial redistribution. Marginal tax reform analysis revealed that 
the efficiency element dominates the ranking of commodity groups unless government’s 
aversion to inequality approaches Rawlsian values, although we also found that it was hard to 
identify efficiency improving reforms from the data available, if reforms are to be confined to 
changes in indirect taxes alone.  That at least suggests that consumption patterns are not 
sufficiently differentiated to support any important redistributive role for indirect taxation.  
Further analysis showed that marginal indirect tax rates are essentially constant across the 
income distribution once differences in demographic characteristics are controlled for, a 
result that is robust to the choice of demand system. That again suggests that there is little 
distributional cost and possibly considerable administrative benefit perspective in moving to 
a much simpler tax structure, while making taxes uniform reduces their overall disincentive 
effect. 
This analysis of indirect taxation assumes that other tax instruments cannot be changed – 
an assumption that is most favourable for defending differential indirect tax rates.  If the 
reform can be broadened to include other tax and transfer instruments, then the case for a 
simple and more uniform indirect tax structure is greatly strengthened. Various authors 
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1976; Deaton, 1981; Deaton and Stern, 1986) provide conditions 
under which uniform VAT on commodities is optimal, specifically the ability to tax income 
optimally, and weak separability between goods and leisure. In any case, the non-separability 
of labour is not strong enough to substantially affect commodity tax rates and as Deaton 
(1987) points out “a considerable part of the efficiency case for uniform indirect taxes is the 
lack of any empirically convincing evidence that differential taxes could encourage more 
effort and less leisure”. Given the difficulty of rejecting this maintained hypothesis in 
distributionally relevant ways (Blundell and Walker, 1982; Browning and Meghir, 1991; 
Madden, 1995, 1997), it is clearly difficult to defend non-uniformity on either efficiency or 
equity grounds.  
It also seems reasonable to suppose that income taxes are better suited to redistribution 
(combined with the expenditure side of the budget) than indirect taxes, even in Greece. The 
main limitation of income taxation is evasion, whose extent and precise pattern are still a 
matter of dispute.  However, unless one accepts that present extensive tax evasion is an 
exogenous political constraint, rationalising and implementing an effective income tax 
structure should be possible, given the evidence from other EU countries, and is surely 
desirable.  
Even if there remain doubts about whether the conditions for optimal uniform indirect 
taxes are met, any welfare costs of moving to a simple indirect tax structure have to be 
balanced against the administrative gains of doing so.  Even if it were possible to precisely 
calculate optimal tax rates for every distinguishable commodity (on which we have cast grave 
doubts), the actual implementation of a finely differentiated tax structure would most 
probably create high administrative and collection costs to the tax authorities and compliance 
costs for the tax payers, as well as attracting inefficient rent-seeking activities of producer 
groups.  Judging from available evidence for other European countries (Ebrahimi and Heady, 
1988; Sandford et al, 1989; Rapanos, 1997; Davies and Kay, 1985), there are reasons to 
  21suspect that the administrative gains of moving to a simpler commodity tax structure in 
Greece would most likely exceed any efficiency losses.  It therefore seems that theory and the 
available evidence point towards a simplification of the present indirect tax structure.
22  
The UK indirect tax structure in general conforms with the above principles and its 
simulation on Greek consumers has revealed a realistic alternative tax structure, which is 
simpler, more equitable and more efficient to implement and administer.  It is interesting to 
note that the most meaningful recommendations for restructuring the Greek indirect tax 
system are dependent on the proper functioning of other parts of the tax/transfer system.  The 
same conclusion was reached in the UK tax simulation experiment.  This is hardly surprising 
if one is willing to accept that any equity and efficiency considerations of the government 
have to be accommodated using a range of instruments.  The answer to the role that indirect 
taxation should play will depend on how effectively the other instruments are used.  Thus, 
taking one example, the suggestion for significantly simplifying the indirect tax structure in 
Greece would  further benefit from rationalising and enforcing income taxation, combined 
with a more active role for the transfer system.  In this respect, a more far reaching tax and 






                                                           
22 Complete uniformity might be undesirable, given other distortions such as the CAP, while additional excise 
taxes can be justified for commodities as explained in the paper. 
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  24Appendix A  Basic data for tax calculations 
 
 
Table A1. Basic data on taxes for groups of commodities. 
 













Andrik. et al (1992)      Alog. et al (1996)   
Food  6.0%  29.9% 0.060%  41%  Food  6.0%  29.9% 0.060%  41%
Alcohol  33.6%  0.67% 5.730%  71%  Alcohol  33.6%  0.7% 5.730%  71%
Tobacco  67.6%  2.62% 0.000%  0%  Tobacco  67.6%  2.6% 0.000%  0%
Housing  9.9%  5.90% 5.170%  229%  Housing  9.9%  5.9% 5.170%  229%
Heating  23.6%  4.32% 2.280%  64%  Heating  23.6%  4.3% 2.280%  64%
Furniture  13.5%  9.06% 0.220%  35%  Furniture  13.5%  9.1% 0.220%  35%
Transport  44.0%  10.29% 6.770%  59%  Transport  44.0% 10.3% 6.770%  59%
Communication 13.5%  1.35% 0.030%  13%   Communication 13.5% 1.4%  0.030%  13%
Clothing 13.8%  14.35%  0.010%  7%  
Health 4.3%  7.29%  0.320%  133%  
Recreation 20.0%  3.64%  3.060%  88%  
Education 1.7%  3.14%  0.040%  117%  
Other  7.6%  7.45% 1.130%  140%  Other  10.1% 35.9% 0.410%  63%
wted av.  15.0%    15.0%   
* Defined as the sum of the squared deviations of the taxes  from the group average weighted by the budget share of the 







Table A2.   Expenditure and price elasticities of broad commodity groups for Greece.  
 








Alogosk. et al 
(1996) 
      
Food 0.686  0.537  -0.087  -0.182 
Alcoholic Beverages  0.808  1.034  -0.182  -0.801 
Tobacco 1.117  0.904  -0.328  -0.468 
Housing 0.908  0.948  -0.344  -0.175 
Heating & Lighting  1.063  1.024  -0.053  -0.430 
Furniture 1.104  1.752  -0.084  -0.586 
Transportation 1.535  1.757  -0.490  -0.543 
Communication 1.802  1.407  -0.391  -0.499 
Clothing 1.138  0.976 -1.148  -0.475 
Health 1.232  0.976 -1.841  -0.475 
Recreation & Entertainment  1.622  0.976 -1.493  -0.475 
Education 0.920  0.976  -0.594  -0.475 
Other goods and services  1.336  0.976  -0.732  -0.475 
Source: Andrikopoulos et al (1992). and Alogoskoufis et al (1996) and own calculations 
 
  25Table A3.    Calculation of marginal indirect tax rates -LES versus Working Leser models 
 
  Linear Expenditure System  Working-Leser Model 
Dependent Variable: EQTAX
1 (for LES) 
Dependent Variable: TBURDEN
2 (for W-L) 
t-ratios in parentheses 
(significant coefficients in bold letters) 
       
Intercept         2,73  ( 0,00)   0.1056    (9.01) 
 
Expenditure level: 
     ln(Non-dur expenditure per equiv.adult ) 
 
 









  (1.20) 
        
Age of head of household (ref. hous
3: 51<age<65) 
    Less than 25 years old 
    Between 26 and 50 years old 
    Over 65 years old 
 
     3605 
       803 















     Two adults in the household (ref. hous: one adult) 
     Three or more adults in the household 
 
 
      1518 
      2080 
 
 
  (3.14) 









     One adult female in househ. (ref.hous.: no female) 
     Two adult females in the household 
     Three or more adult females in the household 
     -  829 
     -1421 
     -1958 
  (1.07) 
  (1.64) 







     Dummy for head female (ref. hous.: male head)           405     (0.84)   0.0009   (0.39) 
     One child in the household (ref.hous.:no children)         -658    (2.81)  -0.0022   (4.76) 
     Two children in the household         -806    (3.14)  -0.0043   (3.47) 
     Three or more children present in the household         -983    (2.41)  -0.0059   (2.70) 
     One retired person (ref. hous.: no retired people) 
     Two or more retired persons  
       -265 
       -367 
  (1.09) 





       
Degree of Urbanisation: (ref. hous.: urban area) 
     Rural area 
 
       -665 
 





     Semi-urban area         -469    (2.37)  -0.0039   (2.25) 
    
Regional Location:  (ref.hous.: E.Sterea and Islands)         
     Peloponese and West Sterea         -322    (1.63)  -0.0057   (3.24) 
     Macedonia          394    (1.69)   0.0057   (4.33) 
     Crete         -734    (3.78)  -0.0100   (4.22) 
     Thessalia          392    (1.06)   0.0053   (2.58) 
     Islands of East Aegeon          611    (1.48)   0.0037    (1.40) 
     Thraki          575    (1.61)   0.0052    (1.88) 
     Ipiros            52    (0.18)   0.0029    (1.13) 
       
Head’s occupation: (ref.hous.:empl. in public sector)         
     Student      -3675    (2.48)  -0.0165    (3.01) 
     Employee in the private sector         315    (1.08)   0.0040    (2.50) 
     Employer (own business with employees)         756    (1.14)  -0.0008    (0.31) 
     Self-employed (without employees)         -15    (0.06)  -0.0021    (1.32) 
     Unemployed       2211    (1.44)   0.0091    (1.42) 
     Pensioner        387  (1.14) 0.0029     (1.23)
 
Level of education of head: (ref.hous.:no/basic ed.) 
     
     High-school education (middle educ.)       -142   (0.70)  -0.0030    (2.35) 
     Higher education       -190   (0.52)  -0.0079    (4.64) 
    
Housing tenure: (ref.hous.: owner-occupier)         
     Rent        624   (2.67)   0.0125    (9.46) 
       
Residual Sum of Squares   2,57E+11         9.84   
F-Statistic   123.26       24.45   
R
2 (R
2 adjusted)   0.3866  (0.3834)   0.1111  (0.1066) 
1 EQTAX: paid taxes per equivalent adult; excludes proportional car taxes. 
2TBURDEN: total indirect taxes/total expenditure; 
indirect taxes exclude proportional car taxes.   
3ref.hous.: reference household. 
Source:    1987/8 HES data (NSSG, 1994), own calculations. 
  26Table A4.    Calculation of marginal indirect tax rates under UK tax system simulation          -
LES versus Working Leser models 
 
  Linear Expenditure System  Working-Leser Model 
Dependent Variable: EQTAX
1 (for LES) 
Dependent Variable: TBURDEN
2 (for W-L) 
t-ratios in parentheses 
(significant coefficients in bold letters) 
       
Intercept       -454  ( 0.81)  -0.0589    (4.80) 
 
Expenditure level: 
     Non-dur expenditure per equiv. adult 
     ln(Non-dur expenditure per equiv.adult ) 
 
 












        
Age of head of household (ref. hous
3: 51<age<65) 
    Less than 25 years old 
    Between 26 and 50 years old 
    Over 65 years old 
 
     3454 
       940 















     Two adults in the household (ref. hous: one adult) 
     Three or more adults in the household 
 
 
      1731 
      3083 
 
 
  (5.91) 









     One adult female in househ. (ref.hous.: no female) 
     Two adult females in the household 
     Three or more adult females in the household 
    - 3001 
     -3660 
     -3757 
  (6.00) 
  (6.65) 





  (9.22) 
  (5.63) 
     Dummy for head female (ref. hous.: male head)           350     (1.30)   0.0021   (0.99) 
     One child in the household (ref.hous.:no children)         -765    (4.41)  -0.0053   (3.86) 
     Two children in the household       -1076    (6.20)  -0.0101   (6.85) 
     Three or more children present in the household       -1294    (5.04)  -0.0137   (6.30) 
     One retired person (ref. hous.: no retired people) 
     Two or more retired persons  
       -564 
       -521 
  (3.74) 





       
Degree of Urbanisation: (ref. hous.: urban area) 
     Rural area 
 
         -33 
 
  (0.26) 
 
  0.0004 
 
 (0.26) 
     Semi-urban area              0    (0.00)    0.0005   (0.37) 
    
Regional Location:  (ref.hous.: E.Sterea and Islands)         
     Peloponese and West Sterea         -124    (0.77)  -0.0002   (0.15) 
     Macedonia          407    (2.86)   0.0051   (4.38) 
     Crete         -365    (1.81)  -0.0058   (2.62) 
     Thessalia          696    (3.41)   0.0082   (3.98) 
     Islands of East Aegeon          830    (3.12)   0.0076    (1.91) 
     Thraki          863    (1.91)   0.0077    (3.02) 
     Ipiros          213    (1.01)   0.0053    (2.26) 
       
Head’s occupation: (ref.hous.:empl. in public sector)         
     Student      -2239    (2.86)  -0.0084    (1.68) 
     Employee in the private sector         511    (2.72)   0.0053    (3.64) 
     Employer (own business with employees)         482    (1.14)   0.0016    (0.73) 
     Self-employed (without employees)         247    (1.28)   0.0018    (1.26) 
     Unemployed       1319    (1.76)   0.0070    (1.94) 
     Pensioner        673  (1.07) 0.0069     (3.33)
 
Level of education of head: (ref.hous.:no/basic ed.) 
     
     High-school education (middle educ.)       -221   (1.63)  -0.0018    (1.58) 
     Higher education       -343   (1.49)  -0.0046    (3.25) 
    
Housing tenure: (ref.hous.: owner-occupier)         
     Rent        607   (4.05)   0.0118   (10.14) 
       
Residual Sum of Squares   1.08E+11         7.91   
F-Statistic   451.85       66.29   
R
2 (R
2 adjusted)   0.6979  (0.6963)   0.2531  (0.2493) 
1 EQTAX: paid taxes per equivalent adult; excludes proportional car taxes. 
2TBURDEN: total indirect taxes/total expenditure; 
indirect taxes exclude proportional car taxes.   
3ref.hous.: reference household. 
Source: 1987/8 HES data (NSSG, 1994), own calculations. 
 
  27Appendix  B The Robustness of Marginal Tax results 
 
The choice of which indirect taxes to raise and which to lower to improve social welfare 
depends not only on value judgements (captured by the degree of aversion to inequality, (ν) but 
also on the specification of the demand system to estimate (and possibly the data set). Here we 
conduct a relatively simple test of robustness, by considering how much the ranking of 
commodities varies with the choice of the demand system and the ranking by tax attractiveness 
(capturing equity). Table B1 gives the rankings for the demand system estimated by 
Andrikopoulos et al (1992) (in the left panel), and by Alogoskoufis et al (1996) in the right hand 
panel. The rows are ranked by the order of the efficiency determinant of taxation, θi/fi, from 
equation (7), i.e by 1 +  Στ kωkεk i /ω i, in the column headed "Rank AIDS".  
  For each demand system, the ranking of the efficiency component is given, first for 
AIDS from (7), then for LES from (7a), and last for indirect additivity form from (7b).
23 The 
next column gives the rank by taxation (lowest ranks have highest tax rates, which would be 
reduced in a move towards uniformity), and the next gives the rank by tax attractiveness 
(computed by ν = 1, though the ranking is relatively insensitive to ν, with the lowest rank least 
attractive for taxation). The final column in each part of the table gives the tax rank less the tax 
attractiveness or equity rank, and indicates the extent to which these two criteria are in conflict. 
  The table reveals the greatest such conflict over transport and food according to both 
Alogoskoufis and Andrikopoulos estimates. In terms of disagreements over the efficiency 
rankings with Andrikopoulos' estimates, housing is ranked considerably lower according to 
AIDS than according to the other two demand systems. Similarly, furniture is ranked lower by 
(7b) than the other two, and health by the LES than the other two. With Alogoskoufis' estimates, 
the AIDS rankings of housing, furniture and communications differ from the other two (which 
are remarkably close to each other). 
  Finally, Table B2 shows the ranking of desirable directions of tax reform for a moderate 
degree of inequality aversion of unity, for the various demand specifications (ranked by the 
AIDS specification of (7)). This shows an alarming degree of disagreement for many goods, 
though reasonable agreement on the desirability of raising taxes on furniture and "other" (though 
that is a very wide category for Alogoskoufis' estimates, and includes many goods that are given 
a low rank by Andrikopoulos' estimates). Food looks possibly worthy of higher taxes (though 
see the qualifications in the text), and tobacco and heating for lower taxes. The different 
estimates give ambiguous signals for the remaining goods, suggesting the serious limitations of 
the tax reform approach, at least in the present context. 
                                                           
    23  The correct way to do this would have been to re-estimate the various specifications on the original data, but 
that was not possible, and instead the own-price elasticities and the expenditure elasticities have been taken from 
the AIDS estimates. 
  28Table B1.   Determinants of directions of tax reform 
 
  Andrikopoulos et al (1992)  Ranking  by      Alogoskoufis et al (1996)  Ranking  by   
Good  Ranking of efficiency component        Good         
AIDS    LES Indirect                  Tax Equity Tax-Equity AIDS LES Indirect Tax Equity Tax-Equity
Recreation/Entretainment          1 1 3 5 9  -4 
Alcohol  2                          6 6 3 7 -4 Alcohol 1 2 3 3 7 -4
Transport        3  3 2 2  11 -9  Transport            3 3 1 2 9 -7 
Housing  4  9  10  9        4 5 Housing 4  8          8 8 4 4
Tobacco                            5 2 1 1 2 -1 Tobacco 2 1 2 1 2 -1
Heating/Lighting      6 10 4  4                  1 3 Heating/Lighting 5 4 4 4 1 3 
Clothing    7  4 9  6  10  -4            
Other                            8 7 8 10 13 -3 Other 8 7 7 7 8 -1
Food    9 13  12  11  3  8  Food  6  9        9 9 3 6 
Communication    10 8  7                      7 5 2 Communication 7 6 6 5 5 0
Furniture    11  11 5  8      6 2 Furniture  9  5          5 6 6 0
Health 12  5  11        12 12 0  
Education          13  12 13  13  8 5  
Note: lower ranks suggest lowering tax rates, higher ranks raising 
          
 
Table B2.   Ranking of tax reform for inequality aversion of 1 
 
   Andrikopoulos et al (1992)  Alogoskoufis et al (1996) 
Good        AIDS  LES  Ind Good AIDS  LES  Ind
Recreation 1  2    6
Alcohol 2  9  9 Alcohol 1 3 4
Housing      3  4 5 Housing 4 7 7
Tobacco  4  1    1 Tobacco 2 2
Heating      5  3 2 Heating/Lighting 3 2 3
Transport      6  7 3 Transport 7 5 1
Food      7 6  7 Food 5 6 8
Communication      8 5 4 Communication 6 4 5
Clothing 9  8  10  
Other    10  13  12 Other 8 9 9
Furniture      11  10 8 Furniture 9 8 6
Education    12  11 11  
Health 13  12  13
Note: ranked by AIDS of Andrikopoulos, lower ranks should have taxes lowered 
1
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